J: 'Was Polus Refuted?' Essay

Was Polus refuted?

In the Gorgias there are several issues of contention that cannot be discussed in full, yet nonetheless can affect greatly whatever conclusions are made in this essay. For instance distinguishing what Socrates thought from what the Platonic Socrates thought is difficult, but this seems more fitting for the study of classics. There is dispute regarding translations too, definitions make or break arguments and it is not always crystal clear the English term is what was meant. In this essay I have used the World Classics translation as a base¹, but much of the quotation comes from an article by Gregory Vlastos. The Platonic Socrates will be simply called Socrates, for the sake of brevity.

In Plato's Gorgias,the discussion between Socrates and Gorgias comes to an end when Polus interrupts and accuses Socrates of putting Gorgias in a position where he felt too ashamed to say what he really thought. They continue along the issue of rhetoric, which Polus initially advocates the teaching and use of, while Socrates disagrees. The discussion moves from rhetoric to power, where Polus sets out his position that wronging another is better than suffering wrong, while admitting that wronging another is 'uglier' than suffering wrong. The introduction of the term 'ugly' is exploited by Socrates, and in the text, it is clear he thinks he has refuted Polus and asserted his own position. Gregory Vlastos was the first to dispute this in his article of the same name as the essay, writing “[Plato] thought Socrates' dialectic had refuted Polus' doctrine, when all it had done was to refute the man.”² This is the line I will take in answering “was Polus refuted?”. Polus was certainly inconsistent in what he said, or was lead to say, and so 'lost' the argument, but I do not think his central premises about suffering and committing wrong were shown to be contradictory in themselves, as Socrates claims. I agree with Vlastos' answer that Polus the man was refuted, but the doctrine of Polus was not.

The doctrine of Polus can be considered a pair of premises, which Socrates thinks are contradictory:

Doing wrong to another is better than having wrong done to you.

And

 Doing wrong to another is more ugly than having wrong done to you.

This doctrine has a intuitive feeling to it. Premise 1 is particularly survival-based, it is not strictly advocating doing wrong, just that it is preferable given the alternative of suffering it. Premise 2 contains the ambiguity Socrates exploits, whether intentionally or not is hard to say, though if he is to be believed, he thinks he is proving Polus wrong with the truth, and brags“the truth can never be proved wrong”³. The ambiguity is to whom doing wrong is more ugly to. Does Polus mean:

'Doing wrong to another is more ugly to the wrongdoer'

or

'Doing wrong to another is more ugly to the audience'

Where 'audience' could mean the sufferer, the public in general, or someone present at the time of wrong-doing. The exact meaning of audience is not all that important, almost any interpretation of 'audience' as long as it is understood as not the wrongdoer, would get Polus out of the contradiction Socrates claims is contained in premise 1 and 2. 

After Polus' premises are made, Socrates starts by asking him of beauty; “In the case of all beautiful things-such as bodies, colours, figures, sounds, practices - don't you call them "beautiful" with an eye to something?”⁴ before stating examples of the listed beautiful things. It is very clear from this statement however that things are considered beautiful by the beholder or viewer with an eye to something, that is, a standard of the beholders creation, that is used to decide if it is beautiful or not. The objective conclusion Socrates reaches cannot at all be considered to be present in this first statement.

In the first example the standards of beauty one compares bodies to is “...either on account of their usefulness for some particular purpose or because of a certain pleasure, if they delight their beholder in beholding them”.⁴

The qualification “...if they delight their beholder in beholding them” is meant to carry over to examples 2 and 3, in which Socrates shortens the sentences, which begin with “So too in the case of...”⁴ and “And likewise in the case of...”⁴ This manner of considering examples is clearly intended to keep the same qualification even though it is omitted after example 1.

Example 4: “And further in the case of laws and practices: does not their beauty fall within the scope of usefulness or pleasure or of both?”⁴

the use of “and further in the case of...” makes it seem that this example has the same form as the previous ones which all had the qualification of 1: “...if they delight their beholder in beholding them” but Socrates is not asking this at all, it is now a question of usefulness or pleasure of both, the importance of how things seem to the beholder is gone, and peerless Polus does not notice it.

Socrates uses this to conclude “So when one of two beautiful things is the more beautiful, it must be so by surpassing the other in one or the other or both of these two respects: pleasurableness, usefulness, or both...”⁴ if the examples were supposed to be consistent with the statement and first premises qualification of beauty, this conclusion does not follow, and no doubt Polus would be confused as to how he had hidden this peculiar opinion in his very bare premises.

All the quotations thus far have come from Vlastos' 'Was Polus Refuted?', but here it is not helpful to use the translation he used for Socrates' definition of ugly “...And when one of two ugly things is the uglier, it must be so by surpassing the other in painfulness or in evil”⁴ where Vlastos says in substituting 'evil' for 'harmfulness' and 'good' for 'usefulness' there is no skulduggery. If we keep in mind that the respects that they have agreed on are usefulness for a purpose, and pleasure, we can re-word it in a way that doesn't introduce new synonyms 'And when one of two ugly things is the uglier, it must be so by surpassing the other in unpleasantness or in harmfulness' where harmfulness is meant as harmful to a purpose, in this way it is the opposite of usefulness to a purpose. This is almost exactly the form that is found in the Oxford World Classics translation:

“And when one of a pair of contemptible things is more contemptible than the other, this is because it exceeds the other either in unpleasantness or in harmfulness.”⁵

More simply one could say:

'when one of two ugly things is the uglier, it must be so by being more harmful or more unpleasant.'

Polus accepts this formulation, and now the stage is set for Socrates' decisive argument, or so he thinks.

The dialogue Socrates uses, while rather straight forward, masks the ambiguity we identified at the start of this essay in Polus' second premise regarding to whom doing wrong is ugly to. Therefore I will present the few pages of dialogue in premises and conclusion form that was given in the relevant lectures, using the above formulation of 'more ugly'.

1. Doing wrong to another is more ugly than having wrong done to you.
2. This must be because doing wrong to another is either:
   a) more harmful than having wrong done to you.
   Or
   b) more unpleasant than having wrong done to you.
3. One could find doing wrong pleasant.
4. Therefore, 2-b is not the case.
5. Therefore, 2-a is the case: Doing wrong to another is more harmful than having wrong done to you.

Socrates concludes Polus' premise 'Doing wrong to another is better than having wrong done to you' is inconsistent with 5. Since 5 follows from 1 (Polus' other premise) Polus' doctrine is refuted. This is not necessarily the case. Remember the ambiguity of 'more ugly to whom', and we can reformulate Socrates' argument as

1. Doing wrong to another is more ugly than having wrong done to you.
2. This must be because doing wrong to another is either:
   a) more harmful to the wrong-doer than having wrong done to you.
   b) more harmful for the audience than having wrong done to you.
   c) more unpleasant to the wrong-doer than having wrong done to you.
   d) more unpleasant for the audience than having wrong done to you.
3. The wrong-doer could find doing wrong pleasant.
4. Therefore, 2-c is not the case.
5. Therefore, 2-a is the case: Doing wrong to another is more harmful to the wrong-doer than having wrong done to you.

In this argument 5 clearly does not follow from 1-4. 2-b is trivial, as the audience would be not be harmed by you doing wrong or suffering wrong. But there is nothing to stop 2-d being the case, in fact it seems this is the sense in which Polus meant his premise to be read. It seems to be the case that the audience would find your actions more unpleasant when you do wrong. The audience would have to be pretty unsympathetic to find you suffering wrong more unpleasant than you doing wrong.

To recognise that this argument does not lead to the internal contradiction of Polus' premises 'Doing wrong to another is better than having wrong done to you' and 'Doing wrong to another is more ugly than having wrong done to you' Is to recognise Socrates did not refute Polus entirely. Polus was certainly defeated by first failing to see the essential difference between pleasure and pleasure to the beholder, and secondly letting Socrates change the meaning of his second premise through the ambiguity of 'ugly to whom'. Of course it could be said that Polus really meant 'ugly to the wrong-doer' but this makes the two premises so obviously contradictory it seems no-one would bother to think of them as a doctrine. Terrence Irwin suggests had Polus not denied that 'doing wrong is worse for the wrong-doer than suffering wrong' in the objective sense of 'wrong', whether or not he realised it, denied himself an avenue of escape by suggesting 'suffering wrong is worse for me than some shameful actions'.⁶

Additionally, Polus could have meant ugly in that sense but retain the qualification of 'to the beholder' and so avoid Socrates' strict objective dichotomy of harmful and unpleasant. For these reasons, it was not the doctrine of Polus that was shown to be inconsistent by Socrates, and hence refuted, but merely the man.

Bibliography

1Robin Waterfield, The World Classics Plato Gorgias, Oxford University Press 1994

2 Gregory Vlastos, “Was Polus Refuted?” The American Journal of Philology, Vol. 88, No. 4, (Oct., 1967), pp. 454-460. The Johns Hopkins University Press, page 459

3 Robin Waterfield, The World Classics Plato Gorgias, section 473b page 47

4 Gregory Vlastos, “Was Polus Refuted?” The American Journal of Philology, page 455

4 Gregory Vlastos, “Was Polus Refuted?” The American Journal of Philology, page 455

5 Robin Waterfield, The World Classics Plato Gorgias, section 475b page 50

6Terence Irwin, Plato's Ethics, Oxford University Press Inc. (1995) page 100

I was kinda wrong.

My theory is a form of probabilism, woops. 

I would like to point out however that in my post "what up with probabilism" i explain what i thought probabilism was:

"Probabilism just isn't explanatory and doesn’t really justify its probabilistic prediction. Why would dividing observed cases by possible cases produce a percentage which is reliable? Fuck knows, I don’t even think they know. Do you know?"

No one corrected me or infact commented at all.

Secondly, I commented on jonos FIRST response that my theory relys on a probabilistic principle.

"yes a probabilistic principle is assumed in both predictions. This principle is the argument stated at the top of my last post... "

The response to which should have been "sam, you silly goose, any theory which relys on a probabilistic principle is probabilism."

This kind of point could have saved us alot of time. Anyway let’s move forward :)

Jonos objection seems to be the contradiction of the following two claims:

1.       'denying probability can be assigned concerning POTENTIAL occurance'

2.       Just because the ACTUAL probabilities are unknown, that does not rule out using probability to pick the option with more possibilities as you say.

By “denying that probability can be assigned to potential occurances” I only mean that the actual probabilities are unknown.

By “using probability to pick the option with more probability” I only mean that my theory applies the probabilistic argument stated initially

I can apply my probabilistic argument to such cases where the actual probabilities are unknown. No contradiction occurs.

I would like to bring your attention to “J: response to S’s rigged die scenario”

You say “All I know is, guessing that it will land on a number higher than 1 contains 5 out of the 6 possible outcomes, while guessing 1 contains 1 out of 6 possible outcomes. Therefore it is more reasonable (you say reasonable, but whether it be reasonable probable, i dont care, take your pick)”

By the same logic can you not say “it is more reasonable to guess that the pattern will continue at least once, than it is reasonable to guess that the pattern will cease”

If so, then the theory works does it not.

J: Why I don't accept your solution to Induction

You wrote in a comment:

"Just because the ACTUAL probabilities are unknown, that does not rule out using probability to pick the option with more possibilities as you say."
ah, yup. cant disagree with that. infact thats about the crux of my argument.
"if all values are equal, choose the option with the most possibilities over those with less possibilities"
i dice example the values (i assume you mean probabistic value) are not equal, their unknown.
"Therefore I think you may as well say 'not 1' is more probable, given the circumstances"
your saying “not one” is more probable? i agree.
and of corse to pick the option which is "more probable" is going to be "more reasonable" which is why i use both terms interchangably.

You agreed with me that one can use probability despite not knowing the actual outcomes.

The actual outcomes of the scenario are (Pr)=1 it will land on the rigged number, and (Pr)=0 it will land on the other 5 numbers. in other words, the dice always lands on the rigged number, and never lands on the non-rigged numbers.

In this I concede your second point that the probabilistic value of numbers 1-6 are not equal, but unknown.

BUT, this is only their actual values. I was talking about the values the guesser assigns to the numbers 1-6, given that they know one number is rigged, but do not know which. In this case, the guesser assigns each number the equal probabilistic value of 1/6 chance of coming up.

Are you suggesting this cannot be done? Are you saying this is an illegitimate use of probability simply because I do not know the actual outcomes? I submit that this is how probability works.

For instance, a coin toss is said to be 50/50. In reality, it is not. The hieght one flips it, which side it was rested on the thumb, the possibility of landing on the edge and not a face, etc etc are all tiny factors. But we ignore them because on the whole, the coin lands equally on heads and tails. The actual probability has nothing to do with saying this. 

What factors into assigning probabilistic value is what is known. Therefore the values of 1-6 as the guesser knows it, are equal, for he cannot consider that one of them is rigged as useful infomation as his guess as to which number is rigged would also be equally spread amoungst the numbers. The scenario to the guesser is the same as one in which he knows the dice is fair.

It is confusing to me that you agree that "more reasonable" is interchangable with "more probable". Why bother to avoid the term 'probable' then? It seems to be mere avoidance so you can say your theory is not probabilism.

I think it is, you are just applying it in a second-order manner, not directly to the dice values, but to guessing groups of values, as you say:

"the pattern continues at least once"...is reasonable to choose over "the pattern doesn't continue"

I think you have in your head a very specific idea of what probabilism is, but if you do a little googling, you will find when it comes to philosophy, as it always does, there is a fucktonne of different theories and aspects to probability and probabilism.

But, regardless, my claim is that your theory cannot contribute a new way of looking at induction when your conculsion of a 'more reasonable' option can be reduced to 'more probable', as you yourself said they are interchangable. This is a telling sign that your theory is an application of probability, not a new solution.

Finally, I remind you of your own argument:

"If all the possible future variations concerning a particular state of affairs are known,

And if no probability can be assigned concerning the potential occurrence to those states of affairs,

And a similarity is present among the majority of the possible states of affairs,

Then it is reasonable to believe that an outcome will occur in which the similarity is present."

 

You have contradicted yourself in admitting the interchangability of reasonable and probable.

You cannot have it both ways, in 'denying probability can be assigned concerning POTENTIAL occurance', you have specified you are not talking about ACTUAL probability here.

Then you say:

 

""Just because the ACTUAL probabilities are unknown, that does not rule out using probability to pick the option with more possibilities as you say."
ah, yup. cant disagree with that. infact thats about the crux of my argument."

 

This is blatant contradiction of one of the key premises of your orginal argument. You cannot have both your key premise and you supposed 'crux'. And this problem cannot be avoided by calling it a 'probabilistic principle', this is again, avoidance. What do you mean when you agreed with me that:

 

"yes a probabilistic principle is assumed in both predictions."

 

Your account of your theory has far too many ambiguities and contradictions to be considered a solution to the problem of induction. I would like to hear what you meant each time you first denied using probability, then said you were using a principle, then claimed the crux of your argument was non-actual probability, and finally said reasonable and probable were interchangible.

J: Reply to S's rigged die scenario

So, my options are guessing that the rigged die will land on 1, or <2,3,4,5,6>. 

I do not know which number it is rigged to land on. 

Therefore I cannot make any assumptions about which number it is rigged to land on.

In reality, the probability of the number it lands on is:

rigged number=1

other numbers=0.

But to me, the probability of each number being the rigged number is 1/6. So adding that fact into my calculation does nothing to influence my decision. All I know is, guessing that it will land on a number higher than 1 contains 5 out of the 6 possible outcomes, while guessing 1 contains 1 out of 6 possible outcomes. Therefore it is more reasonable.

How is this any different from simple probability?

Probability does not hinge on truth; that is, the fact that it may be rigged to land on 1 in no way undercuts the rationale that given what I know, is it more probable to guess not-1 than 1.

It is only because it is more probable to guess not 1 that makes it "more reasonable". The fact that the dice is rigged is negated by the fact that I do not know which number it is rigged to land on. Thus each number has 1/5 chance of being the rigged number. So there is no point introducing either element. You could have simply asked me to guess 1 or not-1 with a fair die. The analysis is exactly the same.

for J

I don't understand your criticisms, in which you refer to the substitution of reasonable and probable so I thought I'd just ask you the following.
There's a 6 sided dice.
Its rigged to land on one of the numbers.
you have to guess whether it will land on 1 or a number higher than one
Do you think its more reasonable:

To guess that it will land on 1
or
To guess it will land on a number higher than one.


Imagine that I'm asking you and I don't know which number the dice is going to land on. if you guess right ill give you a dollar.

S: well shit didnt know you guys would get all blah blah dont be a layman moralist loser and shit. so ill just examine the argument.
"I think we should maximise happiness"
Because
"happiness is something that everyone wants"
And
"I wonna give people what they want"

Well since I'm an egoist, or what ever you want to call it, and think that we can only ever do, or want to do, what gives us pleasure (in a broad sense) I can't really criticise you for wanting to maximise happiness because you want to maximise happiness. That's all it seems to be though and I don't see J's appeal to reason anywhere. it seems to boil down to "Making others happy makes me happy." yah? nah?... wha?
Also it seems that if your holding a doctrine such as "I want to make others happy" because you want to, it seems unnecessary; you could just skip a step, get rid of the doctrine and do what you want regardless of others happiness by the same logic.

J: Response to S's rejoinder

I agree with M here that this hippie/rapist case is no problem for Utilitarianism. All the cases you have thus far produced have very emotive contexts, such that the utilitarian decision seems counter-intuitive. I remind you counter-intuitive does not equal false, or even unjustified. What you instead are showing is the danger of rhetoric and emotion when it comes to considerations of morality. Throw in as many rapists, cannibals and baby-abusers as you like, it does not change the strength of your case one bit. Russell said "the occasions when we feel most moral are the occasions when we are administering punishment" yet he was wise to see that that feeling of moral fervour when we judge the rapist, the murderer, etc is no justification. Reason is required, not emotion.

The arguments for utilitarianism in deciding this case has been well stated in M's latest post. If we consider the past to make a decision when you have expressly set up the case such that the past is irrelevant to the outcome, we are in error. For what cannot be a cause cannot be considered as relevant. The only thing we can control in this case is whether to inflict more or less pain. When understood in these terms, utilitarianism is not counter-intuitive at all, and even if it were, why should one trust intuition and the majority view over a reasoned argument?

The critique you have made is that the utilitarians choice it is not in accordance with what you would do, and you further say that others would agree. Both of these points suggest only in the weakest sense that the decision to kill the rapist is better, because it is the intuitive and popular decision. It does not follow that what is intuitive and popular is true. Thus I see no argument in your posts why the utilitarian is mistaken in their decision. Argue with arguments or not at all.

J

M: Expanded response on utilitarianism

When you say "Both the convict and the hippie lives are filled with an equal amount of pleasure" I'm going to assume you mean that applies for the rest of their lives, otherwise it'd seem fair to let the hippie live a happier non-imprisoned existence.

When you say "...in the other a man that no one knows..." I'll assume you mean to say that no-one will ever know him, otherwise he should be let live as his meeting other people will probably produce more happiness- he is, as you say, "a good cunt".

If the ultimate extension of this example is that there is going to be identical amounts of happiness for everyone regardless of which dies, except you have to torture the rapist as well, the utilitarian view would be to kill the hippie. But this is still not a problem for utilitarianism.
The objection is that some kind of "common-sense morality" would have you kill the rapist, and so that utilitarianism is weird and wrong. This is because you are employing philosophical language to create an unintuitive example, and then trying to fall back on a layman viewpoint in response. Another translation is "because of the rapist's past actions, he should suffer more regardless of how he'll act in the future," which puts you in the "eye-for-an-eye" ethical camp, as opposed to what I think is the more common "turn-the-other-cheek".

In the real world, where we cannot accurately judge other peoples' happiness, nor predict the future, people usually do act in the interest of maximum happiness.

-M

S: To J again about his moral... stuff

im pretty sure your post was too long and smelt like shit. i claim that maximising hapiness isnt always the best thing to do morally because of the example given (lets use my second simpler argument with buttons and what not). if maximising happiness is what we should do, then we should kill the hippie (I claim). we shouldnt kill the hippie (i think your post was saying I have to back this point up(point X)). Therefore we shouldnt always maximise happyness.
If I am right that you think i should back up point X then fine, but you could have said that in like one paragraph. a moral rule such as "the maximising happiness one of utilitarianism" should be synonomous with some kind of common sence view of morality. my example attempts to show this is not the case.

J: Problems with S's "Induction" post

1: You say "all the possible future variations concerning a particular state of affairs are known" and that there is a "similarity is present among the majority of the possible states of affairs".

Therefore we know that among the possible outcomes there is a majority with similarity 'x'.

 So if asked to make a prediction on whether 'x' will occur or not, clearly the probability is greater than 0.5 (the definition of 'majority') and thus "more reasonable to believe".

On this basis I say it is impossible in this case that "no probability can be assigned concerning the potential occurrence to those states of affairs".  

Furthermore, your conclusion "it is reasonable to believe that an outcome will occur in which the similarity is present." seems simply to be a rewording of 'more probable.' The 'no probability' premise is an attempt to bracket off probability and bring in your account of 'reasonable', but they are one in the same and the 'no probability' premise is false.

 2: In the dice example, you say there is a die (6 faces, it will land on one of them) and the claim is: 

"It is more reasonable to believe that it will land on a face higher than 1 than it is reasonable to believe it will land on 1"

In a single roll, there is a 1/6 chance it will land on 1, and there is a 5/6 chance it will land on not-1.

Changing 'probable' for 'reasonable' does not change the fact that this is a prediction based on the outcomes of 5/6 vs 1/6, where anyone can see 5/6 is "more reasonable to believe".

3: the same issue of swapping 'probable' for 'reasonable' is the case in your next example:

"It is more reasonable to believe that the pattern will continue at least once than it is reasonable to believe that the pattern will not continue at least once."

has the same form as:

'the pattern will continue at least once' is more probable than 'the pattern will not continue at least once.'

You can only get to 'more reasonable to believe outcome x over outcome y' through a probabalistic principle.

 

M: Response to S's second response.

M: "Push button A and the hippie is killed. Push button B and the rapist is more gruesomely killed. The additional pain inflicted on the convict out ways any pleasure one would get from inflicting the pain on him. No one will ever know who is killed either way. Both the convict and the hippie lives are filled with an equal amount of pleasure."

This amended example seems to have missed the point of my previous objection. The utilitarian makes a decision based on the overall happiness achieved by their actions (It is a consequentialist philosophy) so their actions are based on how they think society (ie. other people) will be affected. Probably most utiliarians would still kill the rapist- even considering the torture- because they assume he we go on to rape, a tortuous act in itself.

J: Utilitarians must consider overall happiness, not just the happiness of the hippie and the rapist. the fact they enjoy their life styles equally is not the issue here, dude.

S: what is up with probabilism?

Probabilism just isn't explanatory and doesn’t really justify its probabilistic prediction. Why would dividing observed cases by possible cases produce a percentage which is reliable? Fuck knows, I don’t even think they know. Do you know?

S: I know the ontological argument sucks, but why?

Process 1:

World one: Imagine a possible world in which your father is as real as you are.

World two: Imagine a possible world in which your father is not real, he is an illusion conjured by your sick brain.

In world one your father exists. In world two your father does not exist. Thus you can imagine a concept existing and not existing. Throughout this process however your belief in your father's existence did not vary.  Thus we are able to perform the following:

Conceive of a possible world in which X exists, while believing that that possible world is the actual world.

Conceive of a possible world in which X does not exist, while believe that that possible world is not the actual world.

Process 2:

World three: Imagine a possible world in which unicorns are common place and one sits behind you.

In world three unicorns exist. Throughout process 2 however your belief in unicorn's existence doesn’t change.

Thus you can conceive of a possible world in which X exists, without believing that that possible world is the actual world.

The Ontological:

When an atheist is asked to imagine god, the atheist imagines a possible world in which god exists. When an atheist claims that god does not exists, he is claiming: I believe that the possible world in which god exists is not the actual world.

Thus existence is not a property. When one claims "X does not exist" one is not imagining the thing not existing; Instead one is imagining a possible world in which X does exist and then holding the added belief that that particular possible world is not the actual world.

The ontological argument stems from the claim that the atheistic and theistic conceptions of god are different. The ontological makes the further claim that the atheistic conception is inconsistent with a maximally great being as existence is a perfection. This claim is mistaken as both the atheist and the theist are conceiving of possible worlds in which god exists and is maximally great. The difference is that the theist believes this possible world to be the actual world and the atheist does not. 
 

S: Induction

Argument for predictions made on the basis of majority or APBM:

If all the possible future variations concerning a particular state of affairs are known,

And if no probability can be assigned concerning the potential occurrence to those states of affairs,

And a similarity is present among the majority of the possible states of affairs,

Then it is reasonable to believe that an outcome will occur in which the similarity is present.

The soundness of this argument is illustrated in the following example.

Imagine you know the following and only the following:

There is a dice,

It has six faces,

It will land on one of its faces,

You must make a prediction regarding whether or not the dice will land on 1.

It is more reasonable to believe that it will land on a face higher than 1 than it is reasonable to believe it will land on 1. This is because the similarity of "being a number higher than one" is present among the majority of the possible outcomes.

Thus if we must make a decision, it is reasonable to predict that the dice will land on a number higher than one.

We must make a prediction.

Thus it is reasonable to predict that the dice will land on a number higher than one.

Similarly:

If we consider how many times a pattern observed in the past could continue in the future, we find that there are more possibilities in which the pattern continues at least once than there are possibilities to the contrary.

We must make a prediction regarding whether or not the pattern will continue.

It is more reasonable to believe that the pattern will continue at least once than it is reasonable to believe that the pattern will not continue at least once. This is because the similarity of "the pattern continues at least once" is present among the majority of the possible outcomes.

Thus if we must make a decision, it is reasonable to predict that the pattern will continue at least once.

We must make a prediction.

Thus it is reasonable to predict that the pattern will continue at least once.

APBM does not give us certain knowledge. It instead provides us with a justification for inductive reasoning. Once a pattern is observed it is more reasonable to make a prediction regarding whether or not the pattern will continue then it is reasonable to not make a prediction. This is because one is more likely to make a correct prediction if one makes a prediction. APBM shows that when forced to make a prediction regarding the patterns continuation it is more reasonable to predict it will continue than it is reasonable to make a prediction to the contrary. To deny this is to deny the reasonableness of the initial prediction made in the dice example. That is to say to deny the previous conclusion would be to claim that it is more reasonable to predict that the dice will land on one as opposed to a number higher than one.

S

S: Utilitarian case #2

S:

ahuh ahuh I see I see. Indeed the murderer would seemingly cause more harm than the victim of the attack.

It seems I'll have to provide a different example to illustrate Utilitarianisms shitness. In one room there's a convicted rapist and murderer. In the other a man that no one knows, he lives a quiet life out in the forest where he splits his time between picking flowers and looking at the stars. Both are captured and put in a room. A Utilitarian is asked to push one of two buttons. Push button A and the hippie is killed. Push button B and the rapist is more gruesomely killed. The additional pain inflicted on the convict out ways any pleasure one would get from inflicting the pain on him. No one will ever know who is killed either way. Both the convict and the hippie lives are filled with an equal amount of pleasure.

The utilitarian would seemingly kill the Hippie as the death entails less pain. He would be content that he did the right thing. However that's a bit fucked cause the hippies a good cunt and the convicts not.

J: A response to S's post on Utility

The scenarios set up by S are understood as one man dying in either case: 

either your attacker, by slow, painful stabbing (s1).

or yourself instantly by a shot to the head (s2).

We will assume the utilitarian principle is that one should choose the outcome that maximises happiness for the maximum number of people.

S considers that the utilitarian must choose s2 despite it being you who dies when you did nothing wrong, and despite that you were attacked and stabbed the man in self defence. Because both outcomes result in death, and s2 contains the least pain, it is thus the happier outcome relative to s1. This is consistent with the general utilitarian view, though it does not take into account your capacity to make others happy vs. the gunman, or how happy you are in surrendering yourself vs. stabbing the man, or how happy the gunman is in killing you vs. getting stabbed. All of these are assumptions, and there are many more, predicting the future is no easy task and no small problem for utilitarians. But let us charitably interpret the argument to the bare facts that in s1 there is more physical pain than s2.

My primary concern is that the conclusion "...it seems that maximising happiness is not always the most moral outcome." is not supported by any moral theory, normative, nor pragmatic nor meta-ethical. It is simply stated, with no argument to back it up. Scenarios were set up, a utilitarian response was sketched, and then declared wrong with no backing. All that one can assume from the argument is that S disagrees with some part of the scenario, or some part of the utilitarian principle (as S understands it, there are in fact many, many interpretations). 

On this basis the conclusion is entirely invalid.
I note S rightly says utilitarianism is a normative theory, that is, regarding what one ought to do. It is not a theory that explains how people actually think when presented with such scenarios. If you accept utilitarianism, then you ought to choose the option that maximises happiness, regardless. To criticise utilitarianism normatively, one needs to say that one ought not to maximise happiness. To criticise it metaphysically, one should discuss the claim on what goodness is.
To criticise utilitarianism pragmatically, as I suspect the conclusion tries to do, utilitarianism would need to first include an additional claim that people actually do act as they ought to. On all three of the Straw Men's interpretations, and indeed no-one I have ever heard or read of, makes this claim.

J

M: In defense of the utilitarian

The utilitarian acts based on her rational vision of the future- as we all believe we do. She is aware that in the future, there is a near infinite potential for greater happier if her life continues- and most probably, depending on the individual's other metaphysical views regarding other minds, potential for great happiness in the life of her attacker. Her primary motivation is therefore to prevent death- that would be the most "moral" option if possible (stabbing and disarming/disabling the attacker for example).

It is also entirely possible she could choose the course of action that involves stabbing and killing her attacker. All she knows of the figure is that he is willing to kill innocents, it follows that by killing them she is more likely to prevent loss of life, and so loss of potential happiness, than by letting herself die- unless, suppose, she is a killer herself.

-M

S:

Utilitarianism is a theory in normative ethics holding that the proper course of action is the one that maximizes overall "happiness". 

Scenario one: Imagine walking down a dark street. A large man jumps out from behind a bush with a pistol intent on shooting you dead. you grab the gun and strain to keep the barrel from being pointed at you. You can feel that you are loosing the struggle and stab him repetitively with a knife from your pocket. The man drops the gun, falls backwards and dies over the coarse of a minute or so.

Scenario two: Imagine walking down a dark street. A large man jumps out from behind a bush with a pistol intent on shooting you dead. You make no attempt to resist and he shoots you in the head. You die instantly.

In both scenarios a man is killed. However in the first scenario the man killed feels considerably more pain than the victim in the second. Thus it seems a Utilitarian is committed to claiming that if faced with such a situation the proper course of action would be to let yourself be shot in the head. However because the second scenario is superior in moral terms it seems that maximizing happiness is not always the most moral outcome.

S.

J: There is nothing hiding behind the Pleasant Pineapple

 The following is my attempt at a summarisation and reworking of the later Ludwig Wittgenstein's writings on use and meaning, from which I hope to use it as a base in posts to come. It does not cover everything, it does not even hold the true power of the Philosophical Investiagations; the investigation of many cases of use, not in generalisation and definitions. That cannot be summarised or contained here or anywhere except the book itself.

In the language-game of this essay the meaning of the quote from Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (PI) “For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word ‘meaning’ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.”(PI, I, 43) will be in its use as the Wittgensteinian base from which I will try to define a use theory of meaning, with the help of the PI. To be clear, every mention of Wittgenstein hereafter is of the later Wittgenstein. I am not trying to interpret the PI in a way Wittgenstein would approve of, nor am I attempting my own 'Kripkenstein', by all accounts both of these are far beyond the scope of this essay. I am merely in need of a more generalised concept in order to examine in more detail the common and seemingly damning objection of novel sentences. Once so defined, we can then “look and see”(PI, I, 66) but also think about responses for the Wittgensteinian-based use theorist. Are there any routes of escape? What would 'biting the bullet' entail? Does the objection leaves no viable way to keep the theory?

               The use theory of meaning is an alternative to a group of theories about meaning that could be roughly called realist. These theories attempt to explain how words have meaning by saying they are given it by something, be it description, reference, proposition...etc. One could say (again, roughly) that they are attempting to connect language with the world, and this relation is what gives meaning. It is the posit of this relation that causes a lot of trouble, as well as the more internal problems of individual realist theories. The use theory was a breath of fresh, anti-realist air in the 20^th century. Anti-realist theories of meaning say this relation between word and world doesn't account for meaning, and instead looks at how language interacts with itself to explain it. “Language is something people do” (Lycan, p.78), and the ways in which people use language cannot be so easily categorised and labelled into things like assertion, question and command, as perhaps Frege thought (Stanford, Wittgenstein section 3.3).

               'Language' is best described in the use theory as linguistic expression, rather than utterances, sentences, words...etc. 'Linguistic expression' hits the right intuitive note about language as an activity, rather than something abstract. The use theorist says the realist is confused in trying to locate the meaning within a linguistic expression; it doesn't exist in that sense. Meaning is auxiliary to the expression, granted by people if the expression is used correctly. 'Correct and incorrect' are not being used in any sense that relates to truth and falsity, but merely in the weaker sense that the community accepts or denies the expression meaning.

This explanation needs some clarification to be understood in the right way. If we understand linguistic expression as a sort of social behaviour, something people do, it is obvious people do it in different ways, depending on how you were taught. This does not mean some is right and some is wrong, but that meaning is dependent on use in the right way in the right circumstances. We will use the term 'community' to describe a group that uses language in the same way. I realise this is vague, and will be addressed shortly.

               We will use the term 'rule' to explain similarities in how language is used within a community. Wittgenstein refuses to define 'rule' in terms of its nature, but its use is clear. When a linguistic expression follows a rule, it is said to be used correctly, and therefore to have meaning. Ever consistent, it seems always to be the use of things that interest Wittgenstein, not the things themselves. Russell, Ayer, and so on, including the author of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus looked into the words for meaning, but a simple, elemental form could never accommodate the variety and multitude of uses of the word. His definitions are are thus intentionally vague, while his repeated uses in the examples of the PI are enlightening and clarifying upon investigation. It is this shift that makes the PI so irreducible.
               To learn what is expected from what is unexpected, given the circumstances is to learn the rule. One need not think of the rule in itself to know this. To clarify further, rules are not abstract things that give meaning. The community agrees (consciously or otherwise) on the rules.

We have thus far been using the terms 'linguistic expression', 'community', 'rules' without a clear idea of what counts and what doesn't. The reason is because anti-realist theories of language have to take language as it is and cannot posit things to sum up common elements. So to help grasp the ideas, the analogy of 'language-games' is helpful.

               A particular community can be viewed as the players of a particular language-game. Within the game the players use linguistic expressions as 'moves' that are communally/publicly determined to be correct or incorrect according to the 'rules'. This analogy is particularly powerful in linking linguistic expression with non-linguistic context, such that the former has no meaning outside of the latter. (Kenny, Wittgenstein, p14)

Wittgenstein refuses to define what doesn't count as a game or rule. He thinks to do so would be to draw boundaries on the word which do not exist and weren't needed until we drew them “of course we can draw a sharp boundary if we wish, in the same way a pace can be standardised as 75cm.; but that does not mean the non-standardised concept is unusable (PG 113 ; PI, I, 69)” ( Kenny, Wittgenstein, p168). It is therefore a mistake to think of 'rules' and 'games' as always like the example of chess. To compare language solely to such a game would be something of a straw man. The classic example he uses of a builders language-game is not meant to summarise the essence of how we use language, but to be used as 'objects of comparison to help us see similarities and dissimilarities' (PI, I, 130).

              The builders language game has two players, the builder A, and the assistant B. There are four words A can say: block, pillar, slab, beam. For each word, their use in this game is for B to bring the builder the stone A called out. In this game, it is clear what A means in calling out “slab” is not the referent of 'slab', nor the definition. It is also easy to see here how B can 'use' the call correctly or incorrectly without actually having to linguistically express anything. He can follow the rule to bring the builder a slab without saying the word “slab” at all.

              The question “what is the time?” is simple, but “what is time?” is an incredibly complicated philosophical problem. This is because we think of 'time' as a name for a thing, and then set about analysing and considering it, without realising our mistake. I can think of no better way to put it than Wittgenstein does in the following: 
 “I want to restrict the term 'name' to what can occur in the combination 'X exists'. -Thus one cannot say 'red exists', because if there were no red it could not be spoken of at all. Better: If “X exists” is meant simply to say “X” has a meaning, -then it is not a proposition which treats of X, but a proposition about our use of language,that is, about the use of the word “X”.” (PI, I, 58)

We cannot see the whole world cleary because we cannot get outside the world to take a picture of it. likewise we cannot see clearly into language at the metaphysical relations behind our words. all we can see clearly of language is the way it works. This is the only study or philosophy of language there is, and in this realisation, the questions of relations to the world dissapear, and this itself is the answer. To realise that there is nothing hiding behind the words "this is a very pleasant pineapple", that the clear, external uses of the words is all there is to them, is to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle.

J