J: Why I don't accept your solution to Induction

You wrote in a comment:

"Just because the ACTUAL probabilities are unknown, that does not rule out using probability to pick the option with more possibilities as you say."
ah, yup. cant disagree with that. infact thats about the crux of my argument.
"if all values are equal, choose the option with the most possibilities over those with less possibilities"
i dice example the values (i assume you mean probabistic value) are not equal, their unknown.
"Therefore I think you may as well say 'not 1' is more probable, given the circumstances"
your saying “not one” is more probable? i agree.
and of corse to pick the option which is "more probable" is going to be "more reasonable" which is why i use both terms interchangably.

You agreed with me that one can use probability despite not knowing the actual outcomes.

The actual outcomes of the scenario are (Pr)=1 it will land on the rigged number, and (Pr)=0 it will land on the other 5 numbers. in other words, the dice always lands on the rigged number, and never lands on the non-rigged numbers.

In this I concede your second point that the probabilistic value of numbers 1-6 are not equal, but unknown.

BUT, this is only their actual values. I was talking about the values the guesser assigns to the numbers 1-6, given that they know one number is rigged, but do not know which. In this case, the guesser assigns each number the equal probabilistic value of 1/6 chance of coming up.

Are you suggesting this cannot be done? Are you saying this is an illegitimate use of probability simply because I do not know the actual outcomes? I submit that this is how probability works.

For instance, a coin toss is said to be 50/50. In reality, it is not. The hieght one flips it, which side it was rested on the thumb, the possibility of landing on the edge and not a face, etc etc are all tiny factors. But we ignore them because on the whole, the coin lands equally on heads and tails. The actual probability has nothing to do with saying this. 

What factors into assigning probabilistic value is what is known. Therefore the values of 1-6 as the guesser knows it, are equal, for he cannot consider that one of them is rigged as useful infomation as his guess as to which number is rigged would also be equally spread amoungst the numbers. The scenario to the guesser is the same as one in which he knows the dice is fair.

It is confusing to me that you agree that "more reasonable" is interchangable with "more probable". Why bother to avoid the term 'probable' then? It seems to be mere avoidance so you can say your theory is not probabilism.

I think it is, you are just applying it in a second-order manner, not directly to the dice values, but to guessing groups of values, as you say:

"the pattern continues at least once"...is reasonable to choose over "the pattern doesn't continue"

I think you have in your head a very specific idea of what probabilism is, but if you do a little googling, you will find when it comes to philosophy, as it always does, there is a fucktonne of different theories and aspects to probability and probabilism.

But, regardless, my claim is that your theory cannot contribute a new way of looking at induction when your conculsion of a 'more reasonable' option can be reduced to 'more probable', as you yourself said they are interchangable. This is a telling sign that your theory is an application of probability, not a new solution.

Finally, I remind you of your own argument:

"If all the possible future variations concerning a particular state of affairs are known,

And if no probability can be assigned concerning the potential occurrence to those states of affairs,

And a similarity is present among the majority of the possible states of affairs,

Then it is reasonable to believe that an outcome will occur in which the similarity is present."

 

You have contradicted yourself in admitting the interchangability of reasonable and probable.

You cannot have it both ways, in 'denying probability can be assigned concerning POTENTIAL occurance', you have specified you are not talking about ACTUAL probability here.

Then you say:

 

""Just because the ACTUAL probabilities are unknown, that does not rule out using probability to pick the option with more possibilities as you say."
ah, yup. cant disagree with that. infact thats about the crux of my argument."

 

This is blatant contradiction of one of the key premises of your orginal argument. You cannot have both your key premise and you supposed 'crux'. And this problem cannot be avoided by calling it a 'probabilistic principle', this is again, avoidance. What do you mean when you agreed with me that:

 

"yes a probabilistic principle is assumed in both predictions."

 

Your account of your theory has far too many ambiguities and contradictions to be considered a solution to the problem of induction. I would like to hear what you meant each time you first denied using probability, then said you were using a principle, then claimed the crux of your argument was non-actual probability, and finally said reasonable and probable were interchangible.