J: A response to S's post on Utility

The scenarios set up by S are understood as one man dying in either case: 

either your attacker, by slow, painful stabbing (s1).

or yourself instantly by a shot to the head (s2).

We will assume the utilitarian principle is that one should choose the outcome that maximises happiness for the maximum number of people.

S considers that the utilitarian must choose s2 despite it being you who dies when you did nothing wrong, and despite that you were attacked and stabbed the man in self defence. Because both outcomes result in death, and s2 contains the least pain, it is thus the happier outcome relative to s1. This is consistent with the general utilitarian view, though it does not take into account your capacity to make others happy vs. the gunman, or how happy you are in surrendering yourself vs. stabbing the man, or how happy the gunman is in killing you vs. getting stabbed. All of these are assumptions, and there are many more, predicting the future is no easy task and no small problem for utilitarians. But let us charitably interpret the argument to the bare facts that in s1 there is more physical pain than s2.

My primary concern is that the conclusion "...it seems that maximising happiness is not always the most moral outcome." is not supported by any moral theory, normative, nor pragmatic nor meta-ethical. It is simply stated, with no argument to back it up. Scenarios were set up, a utilitarian response was sketched, and then declared wrong with no backing. All that one can assume from the argument is that S disagrees with some part of the scenario, or some part of the utilitarian principle (as S understands it, there are in fact many, many interpretations). 

On this basis the conclusion is entirely invalid.
I note S rightly says utilitarianism is a normative theory, that is, regarding what one ought to do. It is not a theory that explains how people actually think when presented with such scenarios. If you accept utilitarianism, then you ought to choose the option that maximises happiness, regardless. To criticise utilitarianism normatively, one needs to say that one ought not to maximise happiness. To criticise it metaphysically, one should discuss the claim on what goodness is.
To criticise utilitarianism pragmatically, as I suspect the conclusion tries to do, utilitarianism would need to first include an additional claim that people actually do act as they ought to. On all three of the Straw Men's interpretations, and indeed no-one I have ever heard or read of, makes this claim.

J