Process 1:
World one: Imagine a possible world in which your father is as real as you are.
World two: Imagine a possible world in which your father is not real, he is an illusion conjured by your sick brain.
In world one your father exists. In world two your father does not exist. Thus you can imagine a concept existing and not existing. Throughout this process however your belief in your father's existence did not vary. Thus we are able to perform the following:
Conceive of a possible world in which X exists, while believing that that possible world is the actual world.
Conceive of a possible world in which X does not exist, while believe that that possible world is not the actual world.
Process 2:
World three: Imagine a possible world in which unicorns are common place and one sits behind you.
In world three unicorns exist. Throughout process 2 however your belief in unicorn's existence doesn’t change.
Thus you can conceive of a possible world in which X exists, without believing that that possible world is the actual world.
The Ontological:
When an atheist is asked to imagine god, the atheist imagines a possible world in which god exists. When an atheist claims that god does not exists, he is claiming: I believe that the possible world in which god exists is not the actual world.
Thus existence is not a property. When one claims "X does not exist" one is not imagining the thing not existing; Instead one is imagining a possible world in which X does exist and then holding the added belief that that particular possible world is not the actual world.
The ontological argument stems from the claim that the atheistic and theistic conceptions of god are different. The ontological makes the further claim that the atheistic conception is inconsistent with a maximally great being as existence is a perfection. This claim is mistaken as both the atheist and the theist are conceiving of possible worlds in which god exists and is maximally great. The difference is that the theist believes this possible world to be the actual world and the atheist does not.
You should look at Plantinga's ontological argument- it's slightly better.
ReplyDelete-M
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ReplyDeleteNo i dont think it is better. he claims that it is possible that there is a being which necessarily exists in all possible worlds. This is just incompatible with possible worlds. for example "there could be a being which necessarily exists" "But I can imagine a possible world in which said being doesn’t exist" "No you cant because said being necessarily exists". It seems to beg the question and restrict possible worlds to possible worlds inwhich there is the necessary being. You cannot claim "all possible worlds must include X" If someone can propose a possible world which doesnt include X.
ReplyDeleteHe doesn't claim that it's possible, he claims that it's necessary, because "necessary" is a more maximal perfection than contingent. The point is that in our model of language, anything we define as maximally perfect (re. Only god) exists or else we're using language wrongly.
ReplyDeleteJ:
ReplyDeleteNecessary by definition means 'exists in all PWs'. By positing a maximally great being in one possible world, it follows it is necessary in that world (as M said, necessary > contingent)and therefore in every world. If you grant the idea of a maximally great being, and don't/can't dispute necessary > contingent, you cannot imagine a PW where the maximally great being doesn't exist.
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ReplyDeleteWe can only understand a claim about all possible worlds if we can understand something about the content of each possible world.
ReplyDeletewe cannot conceive of the content of some possible worlds.
Therefore we cannot understand a claim made about the content of all possible worlds.
Therefore "necessary" is an unintelligible word.
We cannot understand a claim about the content of all conceivable possible worlds unless we understand something about the content of each conceivable possible world.
ReplyDeleteWe cannot consider, or have ever considered, every conceivable possible world.
Therefore we cannot understand a claim about all conceivable worlds.