J: Response to S's rejoinder

I agree with M here that this hippie/rapist case is no problem for Utilitarianism. All the cases you have thus far produced have very emotive contexts, such that the utilitarian decision seems counter-intuitive. I remind you counter-intuitive does not equal false, or even unjustified. What you instead are showing is the danger of rhetoric and emotion when it comes to considerations of morality. Throw in as many rapists, cannibals and baby-abusers as you like, it does not change the strength of your case one bit. Russell said "the occasions when we feel most moral are the occasions when we are administering punishment" yet he was wise to see that that feeling of moral fervour when we judge the rapist, the murderer, etc is no justification. Reason is required, not emotion.

The arguments for utilitarianism in deciding this case has been well stated in M's latest post. If we consider the past to make a decision when you have expressly set up the case such that the past is irrelevant to the outcome, we are in error. For what cannot be a cause cannot be considered as relevant. The only thing we can control in this case is whether to inflict more or less pain. When understood in these terms, utilitarianism is not counter-intuitive at all, and even if it were, why should one trust intuition and the majority view over a reasoned argument?

The critique you have made is that the utilitarians choice it is not in accordance with what you would do, and you further say that others would agree. Both of these points suggest only in the weakest sense that the decision to kill the rapist is better, because it is the intuitive and popular decision. It does not follow that what is intuitive and popular is true. Thus I see no argument in your posts why the utilitarian is mistaken in their decision. Argue with arguments or not at all.

J

M: Expanded response on utilitarianism

When you say "Both the convict and the hippie lives are filled with an equal amount of pleasure" I'm going to assume you mean that applies for the rest of their lives, otherwise it'd seem fair to let the hippie live a happier non-imprisoned existence.

When you say "...in the other a man that no one knows..." I'll assume you mean to say that no-one will ever know him, otherwise he should be let live as his meeting other people will probably produce more happiness- he is, as you say, "a good cunt".

If the ultimate extension of this example is that there is going to be identical amounts of happiness for everyone regardless of which dies, except you have to torture the rapist as well, the utilitarian view would be to kill the hippie. But this is still not a problem for utilitarianism.
The objection is that some kind of "common-sense morality" would have you kill the rapist, and so that utilitarianism is weird and wrong. This is because you are employing philosophical language to create an unintuitive example, and then trying to fall back on a layman viewpoint in response. Another translation is "because of the rapist's past actions, he should suffer more regardless of how he'll act in the future," which puts you in the "eye-for-an-eye" ethical camp, as opposed to what I think is the more common "turn-the-other-cheek".

In the real world, where we cannot accurately judge other peoples' happiness, nor predict the future, people usually do act in the interest of maximum happiness.

-M

S: To J again about his moral... stuff

im pretty sure your post was too long and smelt like shit. i claim that maximising hapiness isnt always the best thing to do morally because of the example given (lets use my second simpler argument with buttons and what not). if maximising happiness is what we should do, then we should kill the hippie (I claim). we shouldnt kill the hippie (i think your post was saying I have to back this point up(point X)). Therefore we shouldnt always maximise happyness.
If I am right that you think i should back up point X then fine, but you could have said that in like one paragraph. a moral rule such as "the maximising happiness one of utilitarianism" should be synonomous with some kind of common sence view of morality. my example attempts to show this is not the case.

J: Problems with S's "Induction" post

1: You say "all the possible future variations concerning a particular state of affairs are known" and that there is a "similarity is present among the majority of the possible states of affairs".

Therefore we know that among the possible outcomes there is a majority with similarity 'x'.

 So if asked to make a prediction on whether 'x' will occur or not, clearly the probability is greater than 0.5 (the definition of 'majority') and thus "more reasonable to believe".

On this basis I say it is impossible in this case that "no probability can be assigned concerning the potential occurrence to those states of affairs".  

Furthermore, your conclusion "it is reasonable to believe that an outcome will occur in which the similarity is present." seems simply to be a rewording of 'more probable.' The 'no probability' premise is an attempt to bracket off probability and bring in your account of 'reasonable', but they are one in the same and the 'no probability' premise is false.

 2: In the dice example, you say there is a die (6 faces, it will land on one of them) and the claim is: 

"It is more reasonable to believe that it will land on a face higher than 1 than it is reasonable to believe it will land on 1"

In a single roll, there is a 1/6 chance it will land on 1, and there is a 5/6 chance it will land on not-1.

Changing 'probable' for 'reasonable' does not change the fact that this is a prediction based on the outcomes of 5/6 vs 1/6, where anyone can see 5/6 is "more reasonable to believe".

3: the same issue of swapping 'probable' for 'reasonable' is the case in your next example:

"It is more reasonable to believe that the pattern will continue at least once than it is reasonable to believe that the pattern will not continue at least once."

has the same form as:

'the pattern will continue at least once' is more probable than 'the pattern will not continue at least once.'

You can only get to 'more reasonable to believe outcome x over outcome y' through a probabalistic principle.

 

M: Response to S's second response.

M: "Push button A and the hippie is killed. Push button B and the rapist is more gruesomely killed. The additional pain inflicted on the convict out ways any pleasure one would get from inflicting the pain on him. No one will ever know who is killed either way. Both the convict and the hippie lives are filled with an equal amount of pleasure."

This amended example seems to have missed the point of my previous objection. The utilitarian makes a decision based on the overall happiness achieved by their actions (It is a consequentialist philosophy) so their actions are based on how they think society (ie. other people) will be affected. Probably most utiliarians would still kill the rapist- even considering the torture- because they assume he we go on to rape, a tortuous act in itself.

J: Utilitarians must consider overall happiness, not just the happiness of the hippie and the rapist. the fact they enjoy their life styles equally is not the issue here, dude.

S: what is up with probabilism?

Probabilism just isn't explanatory and doesn’t really justify its probabilistic prediction. Why would dividing observed cases by possible cases produce a percentage which is reliable? Fuck knows, I don’t even think they know. Do you know?

S: I know the ontological argument sucks, but why?

Process 1:

World one: Imagine a possible world in which your father is as real as you are.

World two: Imagine a possible world in which your father is not real, he is an illusion conjured by your sick brain.

In world one your father exists. In world two your father does not exist. Thus you can imagine a concept existing and not existing. Throughout this process however your belief in your father's existence did not vary.  Thus we are able to perform the following:

Conceive of a possible world in which X exists, while believing that that possible world is the actual world.

Conceive of a possible world in which X does not exist, while believe that that possible world is not the actual world.

Process 2:

World three: Imagine a possible world in which unicorns are common place and one sits behind you.

In world three unicorns exist. Throughout process 2 however your belief in unicorn's existence doesn’t change.

Thus you can conceive of a possible world in which X exists, without believing that that possible world is the actual world.

The Ontological:

When an atheist is asked to imagine god, the atheist imagines a possible world in which god exists. When an atheist claims that god does not exists, he is claiming: I believe that the possible world in which god exists is not the actual world.

Thus existence is not a property. When one claims "X does not exist" one is not imagining the thing not existing; Instead one is imagining a possible world in which X does exist and then holding the added belief that that particular possible world is not the actual world.

The ontological argument stems from the claim that the atheistic and theistic conceptions of god are different. The ontological makes the further claim that the atheistic conception is inconsistent with a maximally great being as existence is a perfection. This claim is mistaken as both the atheist and the theist are conceiving of possible worlds in which god exists and is maximally great. The difference is that the theist believes this possible world to be the actual world and the atheist does not. 
 

S: Induction

Argument for predictions made on the basis of majority or APBM:

If all the possible future variations concerning a particular state of affairs are known,

And if no probability can be assigned concerning the potential occurrence to those states of affairs,

And a similarity is present among the majority of the possible states of affairs,

Then it is reasonable to believe that an outcome will occur in which the similarity is present.

The soundness of this argument is illustrated in the following example.

Imagine you know the following and only the following:

There is a dice,

It has six faces,

It will land on one of its faces,

You must make a prediction regarding whether or not the dice will land on 1.

It is more reasonable to believe that it will land on a face higher than 1 than it is reasonable to believe it will land on 1. This is because the similarity of "being a number higher than one" is present among the majority of the possible outcomes.

Thus if we must make a decision, it is reasonable to predict that the dice will land on a number higher than one.

We must make a prediction.

Thus it is reasonable to predict that the dice will land on a number higher than one.

Similarly:

If we consider how many times a pattern observed in the past could continue in the future, we find that there are more possibilities in which the pattern continues at least once than there are possibilities to the contrary.

We must make a prediction regarding whether or not the pattern will continue.

It is more reasonable to believe that the pattern will continue at least once than it is reasonable to believe that the pattern will not continue at least once. This is because the similarity of "the pattern continues at least once" is present among the majority of the possible outcomes.

Thus if we must make a decision, it is reasonable to predict that the pattern will continue at least once.

We must make a prediction.

Thus it is reasonable to predict that the pattern will continue at least once.

APBM does not give us certain knowledge. It instead provides us with a justification for inductive reasoning. Once a pattern is observed it is more reasonable to make a prediction regarding whether or not the pattern will continue then it is reasonable to not make a prediction. This is because one is more likely to make a correct prediction if one makes a prediction. APBM shows that when forced to make a prediction regarding the patterns continuation it is more reasonable to predict it will continue than it is reasonable to make a prediction to the contrary. To deny this is to deny the reasonableness of the initial prediction made in the dice example. That is to say to deny the previous conclusion would be to claim that it is more reasonable to predict that the dice will land on one as opposed to a number higher than one.

S

S: Utilitarian case #2

S:

ahuh ahuh I see I see. Indeed the murderer would seemingly cause more harm than the victim of the attack.

It seems I'll have to provide a different example to illustrate Utilitarianisms shitness. In one room there's a convicted rapist and murderer. In the other a man that no one knows, he lives a quiet life out in the forest where he splits his time between picking flowers and looking at the stars. Both are captured and put in a room. A Utilitarian is asked to push one of two buttons. Push button A and the hippie is killed. Push button B and the rapist is more gruesomely killed. The additional pain inflicted on the convict out ways any pleasure one would get from inflicting the pain on him. No one will ever know who is killed either way. Both the convict and the hippie lives are filled with an equal amount of pleasure.

The utilitarian would seemingly kill the Hippie as the death entails less pain. He would be content that he did the right thing. However that's a bit fucked cause the hippies a good cunt and the convicts not.

J: A response to S's post on Utility

The scenarios set up by S are understood as one man dying in either case: 

either your attacker, by slow, painful stabbing (s1).

or yourself instantly by a shot to the head (s2).

We will assume the utilitarian principle is that one should choose the outcome that maximises happiness for the maximum number of people.

S considers that the utilitarian must choose s2 despite it being you who dies when you did nothing wrong, and despite that you were attacked and stabbed the man in self defence. Because both outcomes result in death, and s2 contains the least pain, it is thus the happier outcome relative to s1. This is consistent with the general utilitarian view, though it does not take into account your capacity to make others happy vs. the gunman, or how happy you are in surrendering yourself vs. stabbing the man, or how happy the gunman is in killing you vs. getting stabbed. All of these are assumptions, and there are many more, predicting the future is no easy task and no small problem for utilitarians. But let us charitably interpret the argument to the bare facts that in s1 there is more physical pain than s2.

My primary concern is that the conclusion "...it seems that maximising happiness is not always the most moral outcome." is not supported by any moral theory, normative, nor pragmatic nor meta-ethical. It is simply stated, with no argument to back it up. Scenarios were set up, a utilitarian response was sketched, and then declared wrong with no backing. All that one can assume from the argument is that S disagrees with some part of the scenario, or some part of the utilitarian principle (as S understands it, there are in fact many, many interpretations). 

On this basis the conclusion is entirely invalid.
I note S rightly says utilitarianism is a normative theory, that is, regarding what one ought to do. It is not a theory that explains how people actually think when presented with such scenarios. If you accept utilitarianism, then you ought to choose the option that maximises happiness, regardless. To criticise utilitarianism normatively, one needs to say that one ought not to maximise happiness. To criticise it metaphysically, one should discuss the claim on what goodness is.
To criticise utilitarianism pragmatically, as I suspect the conclusion tries to do, utilitarianism would need to first include an additional claim that people actually do act as they ought to. On all three of the Straw Men's interpretations, and indeed no-one I have ever heard or read of, makes this claim.

J

M: In defense of the utilitarian

The utilitarian acts based on her rational vision of the future- as we all believe we do. She is aware that in the future, there is a near infinite potential for greater happier if her life continues- and most probably, depending on the individual's other metaphysical views regarding other minds, potential for great happiness in the life of her attacker. Her primary motivation is therefore to prevent death- that would be the most "moral" option if possible (stabbing and disarming/disabling the attacker for example).

It is also entirely possible she could choose the course of action that involves stabbing and killing her attacker. All she knows of the figure is that he is willing to kill innocents, it follows that by killing them she is more likely to prevent loss of life, and so loss of potential happiness, than by letting herself die- unless, suppose, she is a killer herself.

-M

S:

Utilitarianism is a theory in normative ethics holding that the proper course of action is the one that maximizes overall "happiness". 

Scenario one: Imagine walking down a dark street. A large man jumps out from behind a bush with a pistol intent on shooting you dead. you grab the gun and strain to keep the barrel from being pointed at you. You can feel that you are loosing the struggle and stab him repetitively with a knife from your pocket. The man drops the gun, falls backwards and dies over the coarse of a minute or so.

Scenario two: Imagine walking down a dark street. A large man jumps out from behind a bush with a pistol intent on shooting you dead. You make no attempt to resist and he shoots you in the head. You die instantly.

In both scenarios a man is killed. However in the first scenario the man killed feels considerably more pain than the victim in the second. Thus it seems a Utilitarian is committed to claiming that if faced with such a situation the proper course of action would be to let yourself be shot in the head. However because the second scenario is superior in moral terms it seems that maximizing happiness is not always the most moral outcome.

S.