If in object is green, then it could be grue. Is this a
problem for a theory which predicts the continuation of patterns?..
If,
grue is the property of changing in
some way at some future time
Then,
we cannot reasonably conclude that
any object is grue from some observation of the present
If,
we
cannot reasonably conclude that any object is grue
Then,
we
cannot reasonably believe that there is a pattern of some object being grue.
If,
we
cannot reasonably believe that there is a pattern some object being grue
Then,
a theory which predicts the
continuation of patterns would not predict the continuation of some object’s grueness
.
However this line of reasoning does not apply to “green”
because we can reasonable conclude that an object is green. Therefore we can
reasonably believe that there is a pattern of some object being green.
Therefore a theory which predicts the continuation of patterns would predict
the continuation of some objects greenness.
It seems that if one wants to disagree they either have to
hold that we can reasonably believe that some object is grue or hold that we
cannot reasonable believe that certain objects are green.
S.
